ties into goods? What government controls and business policies are indicated either for the present or after the war? Does the great growth of liquid assets, for example, suggest need for more rigid or less rigid control of prices and wages? Does it indicate the necessity tor continuing price controls and rationing some time after the war?
The present is an opportune time to examine these questions. The country is probably within nine months of the peak of its war output. Trends which have characterized the economy during the rapid rise of war production may soon diminish in importance and may even reverse themselves.
No one, of course, can foresee the future. Hence prediction is impossible. It is possible, however, to construct a frame of reference for one's thinking by making a series of assumptions which may or may not turn out to be close to reality. Such a frame of reference can be useful. It enables one to check from time to time the closeness of his assumptions to reality, and thus, as divergences between his assumptions and reality are discovered, to refine his judgment. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a frame of reference, and, indeed, for many matters several alternative frames. Many of the matters under consideration will be examined in terms of three basic assumptions: (1) "perfect" control of prices and wages; (2) "good" control of prices and wages; and (3) "fair" control of prices and wages. Definitions of these expressions will be presented later. 
H. The Sources of Liquid Assets
Facts concerning the ownership of the great increase in liquid assets are unfortunately far less complete or reliable than is to be desired. Apparently more than half of the increase represents the savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses. The Department of Commerce estimates that the annual savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses more than trebled between 1940 and 1942, rising from 7.5 billion dollars in 1940 to 13.7 a Despite the close agreement between the estimates of the Department of Commerce and the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1941, I suspect that both estimates may be somewhat too high--perhaps by 2.0 billion dollars. The Securities and Exchange Commission concludes that all of the increase in money outside of banks and nongovernmental bank deposits during 1941 went to individuals and unincorporated businesses. The entire increase was about 5.6
billions. It is true that during 1941 corporations spent unprecedented amounts of their own money on plant and equipment and on building up inventories. It is also true that they received relatively small sums from the outside. I am skeptical, however, of the conclusion that none of the large increase in cash and deposits during 1941 went to corporations. This skepticism is reinforced by the fact that in the following year the Securities and Exchange Commission seems greatly to have overestimated the increase in the demand deposits of individuals. 4 Securities and Exchange Commission, Statistical Series, Release No. 731, May 20, 1943 . The Securities and Exchange Commission includes purchases of automobiles and other durable consumers' goods as savings. I have excluded them.
Consequently, the above figures are somewhat smaller than the totals in the estimates of the SEC.
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Not only have the savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses risen rapidly, but a growing proportion of them have gone into highly liquid forms: currency, bank deposits, government securities, and the reduction of short-term indebtedness. The Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that 38.2% of the savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses took this form in 1940 and 60.3 % in 1941 .5 For 1942 estimate the proportion at about 75.5%.6
The net savings of corporations have been far less than the savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses, amounting to only 1.8 billion dollars in 1940 , 3.3 billions in 1941 , and 3.6 billions in 1942 . Furthermore, in 1941 corporations seem to have become less rather than more liquid. Although nonfinancial corporations increased their currency, bank deposits, and Federal securities by 2.7 billions in 1941, they increased their indebtedness to banks and government credit corporations by 2.7 billions, and they accumulated 4.4 billions in excess of business tax liabilities over payments.7 The drop in liquidity of corporations in 1941 is attributable (1) to the rapid rise in production, and (2) to the efforts of manage- T Survey of Current Business, April, 1943, pp. 17-19 . Corporations other than commercial and mutual savings banks increased their holdings of government securities by 3.8 billion dollars. Insurance companies were responsible for 1.0 billion of this. The excess of tax habilities over tax payments of all corporations was 4.6 bilhons.
s Expenditures of business enterprises on equipment rose from 6.9 billion dollars in 1940 to 8.9 billions in 1941. Probably three-quarters, or more, of this figure Very different was the story in 1942. Nonfinancial corporations increased their holdings of Federal securities, currency, and bank deposits by 15.5 billion dollars.9 In addition, corporations reduced their indebtedness to banks and government credit agencies by 2.8 billions. The tax liabilities of all corporations, however, exceeded their tax payments by about 5.2 billions, and of nonfinancial corporations by possibly 200 millions less. Hence the net gain in liquidity by nonfinancial corporations in 1942 may be estimated at roughly 13.3 billions. When account is taken of the loss of liquidity of about 4.4 billions in 1941, there is a net gain of 8.9 billions in liquidity of nonfinancial corporations in the two-year period.
Only to a small extent, it should be observed, does the great increase in the liquidity of corporations represent true saving. Partly it reflects the inability of corporations, in the face of priorities, material and labor shortages, to spend their depreciation allowances or to continue customary standards of maintenance; partly, the inability of managements to replace inventories (there was a net reduction of about 600 million dollars in inventories in 1942); and partly, a deliberate effort represented expenditures by corporations. There .was a net rise in business inventories of 3.5 billions. (Survey of Current Business, March, 1943, p. 21.) Survey of Current Business, April, 1943, p. 18, and Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1943, p. 269 . Corporations other than commercial banks and mutual savings banks increased their holdings of government securities by 11.0 billion dollars.
Insurance companies were responsible for 3.0 billions of this.
The estimates of the increase in holdings of cash and demand deposits by corporations in the Survey of Current Business for April appear to be based upon estimates of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which, as I have Izointed out above, has underestimated the increase in corporate holdings of cash and demand deposits by the same amount that it has overestimated the increase in the holdings of individuals. I have raised the estimates of the increase in corporate holdings of cash and demand deposits by 4.4 billion dollars above the amount reported in the Survey of Current Business. This adjustment involves a slight error because the increases in cash and demand deposits of insurance companies and mutual savings banks are not eliminated. All of this increase, and a little more, appears to have occurred in the holdings of cash and demand deposits of nonfinancial corporations. Although insurance companies increased their bank deposits rapidly during the first quarter of 1943 (in anticipation of the bond drive in April), their demand deposits dropped about 100 million dollars during 1942--the aftermath of the December bond drive.
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of managements to increase their liquid assets against future contingencies.
Finally, local and state governments have reduced their debts and increased their holdings of cash. State and local budgets, which showed a deficit of 0.3 billion dollars in 1939, had a surplus of 1.6 billions in 1942.1° Between 1941 and 1942 state and local government debts were reduced by about 600 millions, and deposits of state and local governments at member banks of the Federal Reserve System increased from 3,484 million dollars on December 31, 1941, to 3,650 millions on December 30, 1942. These reductions of state and local government debts and increases in cash have been partly the result of better tax yields and the collection of back taxes, and partly the result of smaller expenditures on relief and of material and labor shortages which have made it impossible to maintain roads and public buildings in accordance with usual standards. Expenditures of state and local governments for goods and services dropped from 7.9 billion dollars in 1940 and 7.8 billions in 1941 to 7.4 billions in 1942.
IlL Trends in the Volume and Distribution of Employment
Estimates of income, savings, and the accumulation of liquid assets during the war must rest upon assumptions concerning the length of the war, the size, distribution, and efficiency of the working force, and the expenditure of the government for war goods.
(1) Duration of war: It is assumed that the war against Germany ends late in 1944 and that the war against Japan continues for one or two years more. If this timetable turns out to be wide of reality, it is not difficult to adjust one's estimates for the difference.
(2) The size of the labor force: It is assumed that the labor force, including men in the armed services, reaches a monthly average of 63.0 million in 1944. Under the pressure of war the labor force (including the men in the armed services) has increased from 54.3 million in December, 1940 , to 56.1 million in December, 1941 , and 60.2 million in December, 1942 . The increase of 4.1 million in 1942 will probably not be repeated. Most of the drawing of young men out of schools into either the armed services or industry had been accomplished by the end of 1942, as also had been the drawing of retired workers back into the work force. The number of women in the work force increased from 12.5 million in December, 1940 , to 13.8 million in December, 1941 , and 15.5 million in December, 1942 by June, 1943, it was 16.2 million, exclusive of women in the armed services. The demand for additional workers is limited by the fact that the war-plant construction program is nearing its end, by the scarcity of raw materials, and by the fact that the production of war goods is up to 85% of the peak.n By December, 1943, the work force will be about 62.5 million.12 If the war ends in Europe in 1944, but continues for a year or two against Japan, a small drop in the work force (perhaps 500,000) may be expected for 1945 and a larger one (perhaps a million) for the following year. 13 1°Survey of Current Business, March, 1943, p. 19. 11 Contract awards for public projects in March, 1943, were 304 million dollars as against 664 millions in December, 1943. The floor space in nonresidential buildings for which contracts were let in March, 1943, was 28.3 million square feet as against 67.3 million square feet in December, 1942 . (Survey of Current Business, May, 1943 .) The Department of Commerce reported that by May, 1943 , "the process of tooling up war plants has reached a virtual ceiling." (Ibid., p. 2.) 1ÿ Between January and July there is a seasonal rise in the work force of over 2.5 million. In June, 1943, the work force was up to 63.8 million. The seasonal decline in the second half of 1943 will be far less than normal. Likewise in 1944, because of the high level of employment, the seasonal rise between winter and summer will be much less than usual, probably only about one million. A work force of 62.5 million in December, 1943, would be 8.6 million above the number at the end of March, 1940, when the Census was taken. It would represent an expansion of 6.2 million above the normal increase of about 500,000 a year. Of this increase over 5 million would be women. Most of the women will probably not remain in industry for many years after the war.
1ÿ The drop in the work force will take place partly because of casualties but in the main because of withdrawals from the labor market of old persons and women. The return of a million or two soldiers to civilian employment in 1945 and 1946 would encourage withdrawals from the labor market. British experience may give some idea of the extent of United States casualties to be expected as the PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS (3) The volume of unemployment: It is assumed that unemployment will be reduced to one million, which is the irreducible minimum.
(4) The size of the armed services: It is assumed that the armed services will reach a strength of about 10.5 million at the end of 1943, and will remain at approximately that figure as long as the war against Germany continues. This figure is somewhat below the level of 11.3 million in July, 1944, recently announced by the War Manpower Commission.14 Rapid reduction in the armed forces will probably not be possible so long as the war against Japan continues. For a year or two after fighting ceases in Europe an army of occupation of a million or more men is likely to be needed. The Navy will expand so long as the fighting against Japan continues. An invasion of Japan may be necessary, and the Army must be prepared for it. Even if large reductions in the Army were possible after the defeat of Germany, the government would be reluctant to make them. It would not be easy to sustain proper fighting spirit among the forces in the Pacific if several million men in Europe were returning to their homes and families. The Army may cease admitting new men to replace casualties, and it may release a limited number of men in special categories, such as the fairly considerable number who are 38 or over, men who have recovered from wounds or illness, a few men of special skills, and the considerable number of men who have little aptitude for military service. A drop of a million men in the armed forces is assumed during the first year following the defeat of Germany. If the war against Japan continues for a second year, however, a drop of another two million may well be assumed.
(5) Agricultural employment: It is assumed that agricultural employment in 1943 is 4.2% above the level of 1942, as during the first five months of 1943, and that agricultural employment remains at the levels of 1943 for the duration of the war. Secretary Wickard has stated that one-fifth of our food production of 1943 will go to our armed forces or our allies?5 In 1944 the need will no doubt be greater, probably requiring about one-fourth of the entire production. The demand of the armed services for food will probably drop in 1945, but this decline will be offset by rising relief needs of Europe. The urgent need for food will lead to policies which maintain a high level of agricultural employment.
(6) Proprietors and self-employed outside agriculture: It is assumed that the mortality of small businesses will drastically reduce the number of proprietors and self-employed outside of agriculture from 2.5 million in 1942 to 1.7 million in 1944. With the release of men from the armed services and the war industries after the defeat of Germany, the number of nonagricultural proprietors and domestic servants will rise. It is assumed that in 1946 the total will be 2.1 million.
These several assumptions are indicated in EXHIBIT I under the designation Assumption A. 514,993 killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners between September 3, 1939, and September 3, 1942. Of these, 275,844 were from the United Kingdom and 239,149 from the Dominions and Colonies. (Time, June 14, 1943, p. 35.) In 21 months of war United States casualties were slightly more than 101,000. (Time, September 6, 1943, p. 63.) x4 It is natural for the Army and Navy and for the War Manpower Commission to plan for a larger number of men in the armed services than can be effectively used. Large reserves against the possibility of disaster are, of course, necessary.
Nevertheless, the large forces planned for the middle of 1944 are not likely to be needed, and appear to represent a wasteful allocation of manpower. (3) Money compensation of the armed forces: This is assumed to average about $1,000 per man per year (see Assumption A, EXHIBIT I, for the number in the armed forces).
(4) The effect of the end of the war with Germany upon output for war goods: The end of the war with Germany will make possible a substantial drop in output of war goods. Certainly the construction of merchant shipping will soon be reduced, for the rate in 1943 is sufficient to replace the merchant tonnage of the world in less than three years. Consider- 18 The lag between government expenditures and performance of the work or shipment by the contractor varies with different kinds of goods. Little is known about the lag. In the case of construction contracts, payment is made periodically usually two or three months after completion of a specified portion of the work.
Mr. S. Morris Livingston, Chief of the National Economics Unit of the Department of Commerce, has expressed the belief that government expenditures for manufactured goods are usually made six to ten weeks after shipment. able drops also seem likely in the production of tanks, ordnance, and ammunition. Some of the large inventories of the armed services could undoubtedly be considerably reduced.
The approximate size of the reduction in the output of war goods after the defeat of Germany is highly conjectural. Although total output in the calendar year 1944 is expected to exceed by a small amount the annual rate during the last quarter of 1943, the production of many items will have reached a peak before the end of 1943. Indeed, the output of items representing about 36% of expenditures in the last quarter of 1943 is expected to drop by over 30% in 1944. The production of the remaining items is expected to increase about 19% during 1944. It is reasonable to assume that the end of the war against Germany will cause an accelerated drop in the output of items already being produced at a diminishing rate; let us assume that the production of these items talls to half of the level of 1942. It is also reasonable to suppose that the output of items being produced in increasing amounts during 1944 will, in most instances, experience some decline after fighting ceases against Germany; let us assume that the production of these items drops half way back to the level of the last quarter of 1943. These two assumptions give an output of approximately 70.0 billion dollars of war goods in 1945, a drop of 19.1% from 1944.1ÿ If the war against Japan continues during 1946, the further drop in war output in that year can probably not be expected to be large, say not more than about 10°-/o, to a volume of 63.0 billions. If the war against Japan ends in 1945, a much greater drop in the output of war goods will occur. All of these assumptions concerning the output of war goods are expressed in dollars of approximately 1943 purchasing power. A substantial change in the price level would require new assumptions.
These assumptions concerning the output of war goods and services and the expenditures thereon are indicated in EXHIBIT II under the designation Assumption B. It was pointed out in the preceding section that no sharp dividing line exists between war goods and nonwar goods. If about one-fifth of the nation's food output is consumed by our armed forces and allies, each farmer is about one-fifth war worker and four-fifths nonwar worker. Freight trains carry a mixture of war goods and civilian goods; every railroad employee, therefore, is a producer of both war goods and civilian goods. In view of these facts, the best way to measure the proportion of the working force engaged in war production is through the ratio of the output of war goods to the gross national product.
(1) The number of war workers and nonwar workers in '1942: In 1942 expenditures for war goods were 44.9 billion dollars out of a total gross national product or expenditure, exclusive of compensation of the armed services, of 147.4 billions. Since war goods were 30.5 % of the total gross national product, one might assume that 30.5 % of the employed working force of 51.9 million was engaged in war work. This percentage would indicate 15.8 million war workers.
There is reason to believe, however, that the gross product per war worker is considerably higher than the gross product per nonwar worker. This is partly because war goods are mainly the products of the metal working industries where compensation even in time of peace is above the average of nonagricultural employments. In 1939, for example, the average annual salary-wage per employee in the industries making machinery, transportation equipment, and other metal products was $1,551 a year in comparison with $1,284 for all nonagricultural industries,as Even more, the higher product per war worker is attributable to the pressure of acute labor shortages on wage rates in these industries and to the increase in working hours beyond the average for industry as a whole. The higher wage rates and longer hours are reflected in the annual average salary-wage of $2,553 in industries making machinery, transportation equipment, and other metal products in 1942 in comparison with $2,043 for manufacturing as a whole and $1,660 for all nonagricultural industries. The precise difference in gross product per worker between the war and nonwar industries is not known, but it is probable that the product per war .worker in 1942 was about 20% higher than $2,840, which was the average product for all workers. This gives an average gross product of $3,408 for each war worker in 1942 and $2,649 for each nonwar worker, with 13.2 million of the employed working force of 51.9 million in war work and 38.7 million in nonwar work. The distribution of the working force between war work and nonwar work in subsequent years will depend upon changes in working hours and in efficiency.
(2) Changes in working hours : Between 1942 and 1943 it is assumed that the working hours of nonagricultural employees increase 3.1%, distributed as follows: manufacture of durable goods, 2.9 %; manufacture of nondurable goods, 5.7%; nonmanufacturing pursuits, 2.5%. It is assumed that there are no further increases during the war, but that about one year after the conclusion of hostilities against Germany hours in the manufacture of nondurable goods drop from 43.0 to 40.0 per week (because of penalty overtime) and that hours in nonmanufacturing pursuits drop in the same proportion. The durable goods industries, being mainly engaged in war work, are assumed to maintain their working hours without decline until the end of the war against Japan.1ÿ
18 Survey of Current Business, March, 1943, p. 17 . lg The following notes on working hours may be of interest:
(1) Manufacture of durable goods: During the first quarter of 1943 the average working hours in the durable goods industries (which are the center of war production) were 46.2 per week. This was a small advance over the last quarter June, 1943, p. S-11 .) The unweighted average increase in these 13 industries is 5.8 %. This result is affected by the very large increases in anthracite and bituminous coal mining which affect only about 800,000 employees. A more accurate picture of the change in hours in nonmanufacturing pursuits is probably given by the unweighted average for the other 11 industries, which is 1.9 %. The assumption that working hours in nonmanufacturing pursuits increase 2.5% between 1942 and 1943 may be slightly high, but appears to be fairly c!ose to reality. provement in efficiency in war production exists, though a multitude of sensational improvements have been reported.
Certainly there have been rapid gains in the efficiency of producing important items such as airplanes, ships, ordnance. At the same time one must remember that much war production is concerned with more or less familiar products, in the case of which great and sudden improvements in efficiency are not to be expected. An over-all gain of 10% in efficiency is assumed for 1944 over 1943; a gain of 5% for 1945 over 1944; and thereafter a gain of 3% a year. The nonwar industries are having difficulty in maintaining efficiency. They have lost many of their best workmen to the armed services and to war industries, and they have been hampered by lack of raw material and by difficulty in making repairs and replacements. It is assumed that, despite these obstacles, efficiency in the nonwar industries does not decline between 1942 and 1943 or between 1943 and 1944 . With an end of hostilities against Germany, however, the nonwar industries should recover a few badly needed key employees and should be permitted to make some long overdue replacements and repairs. Hence, a rise in efficiency of 3 % between 1944 and 1945 is assumed. With the further drop in war production in 1946, the nonwar industries will have even better opportunity to raise their efficiency. An increase of 5% between 1945 and 1946 is assumed. Should the war with Japan end before 1946, the increase in the efficiency of the nonwar industries should be even greater.
These several assumptions concerning the output per worker in war and nonwar industries and the number of workers in each group of industries will be referred to hereafter as Assumption C (see EXHIBIT III). It should be emphasized that the assumptions concerning the distribution of workers between war and nonwar employments depend upon the accuracy of the assumptions concerning the productivity of war workers and concerning changes in the working hours and efficiency of war workers. These assumptions cannot pretend to be highly accurate. In so far as they are wrong, the estimated distribution of the working force is wrong. (1) Payments to individuals in 1943: During the first six months of 1943 income payments to individuals were 67.1 billion dollars, or 27.4 % above the corresponding period for 1942. At this rate of increase income payments for the entire year would be about 1-48.0 billions. This estimate fails to take into account the different rates at which different types of income may change. The total income going to members of the armed forces will increase much faster than other forms of income. Miscellaneous labor income (which includes pensions, unemployment benefits, workmen's compensation benefits) in the first half of 1943 was running slightly more than 10% above 1942 and will probably be about 3.8 billions for the year. Dividends are likely to show little change.ÿ During recent years interest and net rents have been increased about 500 million dollars a year. This increase may be assumed to continue. The net income of farm operators is particularly difficult to estimate. Despite an increase in acreage, crops will be slightly smaller than in 1942, but the marketing of livestock, especially hogs, and of poultry will be larger. Costs are rising. Prices will be higher, but the margin between the two years is diminishing. During the first half of 1943 the net income of farm operators was 5.0 billion dollars, 42.6% above PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS VI." VOLUME OF SAVINGS 1943 1942.23 For the third quarter of 1943 I have assumed a 25% increase over 1942 and for the fourth quarter a 20 % increase. This gives a total net income of farm operators of 12.6 billion dollars. In the case of nonagricultural proprietors an increase of 2.5 % in working hours (the same as in nonmanufacturing pursuits) and a rise of 8 % in hourly earnings (the same rise as in the cost of living) have been assumed. A great drop must be expected in the number of nonagricultural proprietors, from about 2.5 million in 1942 to 1.9 million in 1943; this drop reflects the heavy inroads of the armed services and war industries upon retail trade and most of the professions.
Most important of all is the volume of civilian wages and salaries, because these constitute 70 % of all income payments to individuals. During the first half of 1943 civilian wages and salaries were approximately 43.9 billion dollars, or 24.8% above the first half of 1942. The margin between the two years, however, was decreasing. In the first quarter it was 27.4%; in the second quarter, 22.2%.24 Can the percentage rise in civilian payrolls be expected to continue to drop? The answer to this question must be based upon an analysis of the elements making up the rise.
It is a striking fact that the total increase of 27.4% in the first quarter of 1943 over the first quarter of 1942 was considerably greater than the increase in weekly earnings in manufacturing, which was 21.0%. Furthermore, in the nonmanufacturing industries, the increases in both hourly earnings and weekly earnings were far less than in manufacturing. About 800 million dollars of the total increase of 4.6 billions in payrolls between the first quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943 is explained by the increase in nonagricultural employees at work from 38.5 million to 40.0 million; about 870 million dollars by the increase of 3.6 % in working hours;25 and about 1.6 billions by the increase of 9.4% in hourly earnings after the effect of additional penalty overtime during the year has been eliminated.28 This leaves 1.3 billions of the payroll increase to be explained by shifts of employment 23 This large difference partly reflects the marketing of part of the large crops of 1942 which carried over into 1943. 24 Civilian wages and salaries are estimated at 16.8 billion dollars for the first quarter of 1942 on the assumption that payrolls in the armed services were 700 millions, and 18.4 billions for the second quarter on the assumption that payrolls in the armed services were 875 millions. For the first quarter of 1943 civilian wages and salaries are estimated at 21.4 billions on the assumption that payrolls in the armed services were 1.9 billions, and for the second quarter at 22.5 billions on the assumption that payrolls in the armed services were 2.2 bilfions.
The average money compensation of men in the armed services is estimated at $1,000 a year.
*SThe increase in working hours in manufacturing was 5.2%. In nonmanufacturing industries it was much less; the figures from 13 nonmanufacturing industries cited in footnote 19 indicate that it was a little more than 2%, or roughly 2.5%. This gives a weighted average of 3.6%.
It is assumed that nearly all of the increased hours in manufacturing were paid for at time and a half. This is not strictly true. Shift differentials for night work have been spread. Consequently, an increase in payrolls equivalent to time and a half pay for the additional hours in manufacturing is probably a good measure of the increase accruing from both (1) the longer working hours, and (2) the spread of shift differentials. In nonmanufacturing industries the increase in working hours has produced a negligible amount of penalty overtime, partly because some of the important nonmanufacturing industries (steam railways and street railways) are not affected by the overtime provisions of the WageHour Act, and partly because the increase in working hours in nonmanufacturing industries was considerably less than in manufacturing. Inspection of the increases in weekly hours in 13 nonmanufacturing industries between April, 1942, and March, 1943 , indicates that in 6 cases no penalty overtime need be expected either because working hours had not reached 40 a week or because industry was not subject to the time and a half provision of the Wage-Hour Act. In the other 7 industries, the increases beyond 40 hours a week were small. For all 13 industries an increase of only about half an hour per week of penalty overtime seems to be indicated by the change between April, 1942, and March, 1943 . Thus an increase of 2.5 % in working time would increase payrolls about 3.1%.
B It is necessary to eliminate the effect of increased penalty overtime upon hourly earnings because this is counted in estimating the effect of increased working hours upon payrolls. Between the first quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943 average hourly earnings in manufacturing increased by 12.1 cents or 15.0 %. About 2.3 cents of the increase in hourly earnings is attributable to the greater number of hours compensated at penalty rates. This indicates that 9.8 cents of the increase, or 12.2%, is attributable to the rise in straight-time hourly earnings.
In the nonmanufacturing industries the unweighted average increase in hourly earnings between April, 1942, and March, 1943 , was 7.5 %. In these industries the effect of increased penalty overtime upon hourly earnings is so small that it may be ignored. Since about 40 % of nonagricultural employees under war conditions are in manufacturing, the weighted average increase in the hourly earnings of nonagricultural employees, after eliminating the effect of penalty overtime, was about 9.4%.
VI. VOLUME OF SAVINGS 1943 21 from low-wage to high-wage plants--shifts which are not fully reflected in the weighted averages of hourly earnings. The number of war workers increased from 8.1 million in the first quarter of 1942 to about 18.1 million in the first quarter of 1943. Of course, the shifts from nonwar to war industries were not the only shifts from low-paying plants to high-paying ones. Furthermore, many of the shifts from nonwar work to war work involved no change in employer and often no important change in the job or compensation.ÿ7 Nevertheless, the shifts into war work may be accepted as a rough index of the movement between plants into higher-paying jobs. Since an increase of 1.3 billion dollars in payrolls accompanied 10 million shifts into war work, we may conclude that there is for every shift into war work an increase of $130 for the quarter in payrolls (not indicated by changes in number of employees, hourly earnings, or hours of work). 28
What will be the structure or "anatomy" of payroll changes in the second half of 1943? The number of nonagricultural employees will drop (if the assumptions in Section III prove correct), a decline of about 300,000 workers producing a decline of 300 million dollars in payrolls. Working hours (ac-27 These shifts into higher paying jobs within the same plant tend to increase the hourly earnings reported by the plant. Consequently, the effect of such shifts upon payrolls is already reflected in the reports on hourly earnings. ss Production of war goods in the first quarter of 1942 was 6.2 billion dollars out of a gross national product (less compensation of the armed forces) of 31.5 billions. If the output of war workers was 20 % more than the average gross product per worker, it was $761 for the quarter, and 8.1 million men were employed in war work.
In the first quarter of 1943 war output was 16.6 billion dollars out of a gross national product (less compensation of the armed forces) of 39.0 billions. If the output of war workers was 20% above the average, it was $918 for the quarter and an average of 18.1 million men were employed on war production.
The estimate of the increase in payrolls attributable to shifts from low-paying plants to high-paying plants must be regarded as very rough. Being a residual, it reflects any errors which have been made in estimating the increase in working force, the increase in working hours, or the increase in straight-time hourly earnings. It cannot pretend to be particularly accurate. Nevertheless, it is a large figure. One is safe in concluding that it is second in importance to hourly earnings in explaining the great increase in payrolls between the first quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943.
cording to the trends assumed in Section IV) will rise about 2.9%; i.e., 2.2% in the manufacture of durable goods, 5.4% in the manufacture of nondurable goods, and 2.5% in nonmanufacturing pursuits. A large part of this increase, but not all of it, will be paid at penalty rates. Furthermore, allowance should be made for a continued spread of shift differentials. An increase of 4.2%, or 1.7 billion dollars in payrolls, between the second half of 1942 and the second half of 1943, seems reasonable because of longer working hours and the spread of shift differentials.
Great difficulty attaches to estimating the growth in payrolls attributable to wage increases and upgrading. Increases in wage rates appear to be getting smaller. 29 Likewise the rise in hourly earnings appears to be diminishing. During the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943 hourly earnings in manufacturing showed for each quarter increases over each immediately preceding quarter of 2.9 % and 2.7 %, respectively, as against similar increases of 4.3 % and 4.1% in the second and third quarters of 1942. This decline reflects not only fewer and smaller rate increases but less "upgrading" within plants, as the expansion of working forces declines and controls over competition for labor are extended and perfected. If the decline continues (as seems likely) so that the second quarter of 1943 is 2.5% above the first quarter, the third quarter 2.3% above the second, and the fourth quarter 2.1% above the third, average hourly earnings in the second half of 1943 in manufacturing will be 10.5% above the second half of 1942. These assumptions would yield average hourly earnings in manufacturing of about 98.0 cents for the second half of 1943.3o Part of this rise, however, would be attributable to an increased number of hours paid for at 29 The National Industrial Conference Board reports wage increases in 25 industries during the first third of 1942, which may be estimated to have raised payrolls by 0.8%; during the second third by 1.6%; during the last third of 1942 by 1.2%; and during the first third of 1943 by 0.3%. There is reason, however, to believe that the reports on changes in wage rates received by the Conference Board are incomplete for the plants purported to be covered. 30 Figures available since the above was written indicate that hourly earnings in 22 PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS VI. VOLUME OF SAVINGS 1943 23 penalty overtime rates. A deduction of 1.7 cents should be made to eliminate the effect of additional penalty overtime. A rise, attributable to higher straight-time hourly earnings, from about 88.7 cents in the second half of 1942 to 96.3 cents, or 8.6 %, is indicated. In nonmanufacturing pursuits a smaller rise may be expected, about 5.8%.3z For both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing occupations the rise in payrolls attributable to higher straight-time hourly earnings is 6.6%, or 2.7 billion dollars.
Finally, a rise of about 1.1 billion dollars in payrolls may be expected because of shifts from low-paying into highpaying plants and industries. This estimate is based upon the fact that the expected volume of war expenditures indicates a rise in the number of war workers of about 4.2 million, from an average of roughly 16.5 million in the second half of 1942 to about 20.7 million in the second half of 1943. As explained above, an increase in payrolls of $130 per quarter or about $500 per year seems to accompany each shift.
All of these influences together may be expected to raise civilian payrolls from 40.8 billion dollars in the second half of 1942 to about 46.0 billions in the second half of 1943, an increase of 12.8%. The result would be a civilian wage and salary bill for 1943 of about 90.0 billions, or about 18.3% above 1942. The total of income payments to individuals for the year promises to be 137.0 billions. Of this amount about 1.0 billion Will be spent by the armed forces abroad, leaving 136.0 billions for expenditure in the United States.32 I am inclined to think that wage and salary payments during the second half of 1943 are more likely to be above than below 46.0 billions. Furthermore, I have been intentionally conservative in estimating the increase in agricultural incomes. Consequently, this estimate of income payments to individuals for 1943 must be regarded as on the low side, perhaps by 2 billion dollars or slightly more.
(2) Personal tax payments in 1943: The Department of Commerce has estimated that taxes paid out of individuals' incomes in 1943 will reach 14 billion dollars on the basis of legislation in effect in March, 1943.33 The "pay-as-you-go" tax plan will raise personal tax payments in 1943 by about 1.5 billions to a total of 15.5 billions.
(3) Consumer expenditures in 1943: There are several ways of estimating the volume of consumer expenditures. One way is to estimate the probable output of consumers' goods and the probable prices at which they will be sold. As indicated above, the Department of Commerce has estimated that in 1943 about 57% of the gross national product will be absorbed by the government and that civilian supplies will be down 10% or 15% to about 77 billion dollars at prices of February, 1943.34 If there are an average of 32.3 million employed nonwar workers in 1943 and the gross product of each at 1942 prices is $2,734, the output of nonwar goods at 1942 prices will be 88.3 billion dollars. Of this amount the nonwar activities of the Federal Government and the state and local governments will absorb about 12.2 billions,35 leaving 76.1 billions available manufacturing during the second quarter averaged 2.8 % above the first quarter. Consequently, it may be necessary to revise the expectation that the rate of increase in hourly earnings will slowly decline.
The figure of 98.0 cents applies, of course, only to the plants covered by the reports of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 31 This assumes that the rise in hourly earnings attributable to higher straighttime earnings in nonmanufacturing pursuits diminishes in the same ratio as in 4 aT Survey of Current Business, March, 1943, p. S-6, and June, 1943, p. S-7. (In millions of dollars). How much then shall we assume that consumers will spend during 1943? One possible assumption is that they will continue to spend about 11.5% more than in 1942. At this rate their expenditures for 1943 would be about 91.3 billion dollars. Undoubtedly, consumers will spend this amount (and even more) if goods are available. Enough evidence has already accumulated to indicate that consumer expenditures during the third quarter will continue to run almost 11.5% above 1942. Department store sales in the four weeks ending July 31 were 12% and in the four weeks ending August 28 were 6% above last year.
But will goods be available during the rest of the year to maintain such a high rate of expenditures? Up to the late spring of 1943 at least, production of consumers' goods held up surprisingly well. In June, 1943, the output of consumers' durable goods was down nearly 33% from June, 1942. Even in an extraordinarily good year, however, such as 1941, durable goods constitute less than 20% of consumer Total first quarter $18, 807 $20, 973 s This is an extremely important point. There are four principal defects in the usual estimates of output as a measure of consumer expenditures:
(1) The current prices indexes do not accurately measure the rise in prices. Prices are rising more than the indexes indicate because, when raw materials and labor are scarce, and when sellers are in a strong bargaining position, quality is cut. Indeed, cutting quality is a principal method of evading price ceilings.
(2) Consumers are not buying the available goods in the same proportions.
When consumers have large incomes, they buy goods of better quality. Hence, even without a change in the price level, or an increase in the number of physical units (pounds, pairs, suits, dozens) sold, there may be a rise in consumer expenditures because more expensive goods are purchased.
(3) When consumers have large incomes, they are ingenious in finding ways of spending money. These new ways are not adequately reflected in the production indexes. Indeed, time series as a general rule understate new trends, and the dislocation of war makes the new trends particularly important at the present time. Many thousands of men who are working in war plants, for example, have left their families behind and are renting rooms and eating in restaurants while still maintaining the family dwellings.
(4) Changes in the output of goods are assumed to be proportionate to changes in the input of productive factors, particularly labor. But the quantity of goods available for consumption does not necessarily have a rigid relationship to the input of labor. Moving picture houses, busses, railroad trains, may be more crowded and restaurants will give more service with the same number of employees, because the busy hours will be a larger fraction of the day. This condition is also true of many retail stores when overworked clerks give less service to each customer.
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PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS VI. VOLUME OF SAVINGS 1943 27 expenditures. The output of nondurable consumers' goods in June, 1943, was nearly 1% above June, 1942 .ÿ9 By June, 1943 , the shift of workers into war production had nearly been completed. Consequently, the outlook is that the output of consumers' goods during the second half of 1943 will be almost as large as during the first halt. This point is discussed in the next paragraph and accompanying footnote. Inventories in May, 1943, were still fairly large but were gradually being drawn down. Inventories of wholesalers, which reached a peak of 4.9 billion dollars in March, 1942, went down to 4.1 billions by the end of March, 1943, and 3.9 billions by June 1943. Retail inventories, which reached a peak of 7.6 billions in May, 1942, were down to 6.2 billions by March, 1943, and 5.6 billion.s in June, 1943.40 Consumer expenditures are customarily higher in the second half of the year than in the first half. In view of the fact that consumer expenditures are gradually reducing inventories, it is unlikely that the usual seasonal rise in consumer expenditures in the latter half of the year will occur unless price controls break down. Hence the estimate of an increase of 11.5% in consumer expendi-.
tures over 1942 must be regarded as a maximum.
A second possible assumption concerning consumer ex--penditures is that their quantity will bear the same relationship to the output of consumers' goods during the second half of the year as during the first half. In the first half of 1943, consumer expenditures were about 43.0 billion dollars and the output of consumers' goods was about 39.1 billions.4l In 42 Estimates of war employment indicate that there will be ieft for civilian employment about 32.7 million men in the first half of 1943 and 31.8 million in the" second half. During each period about 3.8 milfion w. orkers will be engaged in,.
nonwar activities for the Federal, state, and local governments. Consequently, the number of men available to produce goods for private consumption will be about 28.9 million in the first half of 1943, and 28.0 million in the second half. If the assumptions made concerning changes in working hours in Section V are the second half of the year production of consumers' goods will be slightly less in physical volume but, since prices are rising at about 8°-/o a year, slightly larger in dollars--about 40.1 billion dollars. If expenditures for consumers' goods change in the same ratio as the production of these goods, they will be 44.1 billions in the second half of the year, making a total expenditure of 87.1 billions for the year. This result, I believe, will prove to be too low. Indeed, in view of the normal seasonal rise of consumer expenditures between the first and second half of the year and the incident demand for goods, consumer expenditures during the second half of 1943 are likely to exceed the expenditures in the first half by more than a bare 1.1 billions.
We now have two estimates for consumer expenditures:
a maximum of 91.3 billion dollars and a minimum of 87.1 billions. The truth will probably lie somewhere between. The best way to approximate it is to assume that it is half way between, namely, about 89.2 billions.
Thus far we have not taken account of the 20 % withholding tax. It is expected to increase personal taxes by about 1.5 billion dollars during 1943. Will this 1.5 billions come largely out of savings or largely out of expenditures for consumers' goods? Little saving occurs among recipients of incomes of less than $1,500 a year. At the same time the withholding tax will not tall upon such persons to any great extent because a single person is entitled to an exemption of $624 a year, a married person to an exemption of $1,248 and an additional allowance of $312 for each dependent. Consequently, the 15 billion dollars of consumer income going to recipients of less than $1,500 a year will be virtually tax free. In view of the scarcity of goods in relation to the size of incomes, it is reasonable to assume that most of the tax falling on persons approximately correct, the 28 million men producing consumers' goods in the second half of the year will each work about 1.4% more hours than in the first half, making them equivalent to 28.4 million "first-half" workers.
Allowance must be made for the rise in prices of about 8 % a year. This will cause the output of the second half of the year to be sold at prices nearly 4% above the prices of the first half.
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VlU. INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 1944 , 1945 , 1946 receiving more than $1,500 will come out of savings rather than out of consumption. As a very rough estimate, it will be assumed that 500 mi!lion dollars of the tax acts to reduce con- As pointed out in Section II, nonfinancial corporations increased their holdings of Federal securities, currency, and bank deposits and reduced their short-term indebtedness during 1942 by 13.3 billion dollars; this figure does not include temporary purchases of government securities in anticipation of tax liability. First quarter reports for 1943 indicate that corporate profits were running about 18 % above 1942.4ÿ This rate of increase would produce a rise of 1.4 billion dollars in profits for the year. It is doubtful whether this increase will continue. In fact, corporate profits in 1943 are not likely to be more than 1.0 billion above 1942. As corporations are not disposed to increase dividends, the rise in profits will increase corporate savings. Allowances for depreciation, depletion, and contingencies are running somewhat ahead of 1942, but in the present rough estimate may be assumed to be unchanged; so also may the accumulation of special reserves and capital outlay charged against income. During 1942 there was a net reduction in nventories of about 600 million dollars. During the last quarter of 1942, however, inventories were being reduced at an annual rate of about 3.6 billions. It is likely that inventories will be reduced at this rate through 1943; therefore the drop in inventories in 1943 will be about 3.0 billions greater than in 1942. Purchases of plant and durable equipment by private industry in 1942 were about 6.7 billions. In 1943 these purchases will be considerably less, amounting to probably not more than 3 billions. Three-fourths of the drop in inventories and in the expenditures on replacements is assumed to be in plants of nonfinancial corporations. Finally, prepayments on government contracts, which in 1942 were about 1.8 billions, may be assumed in 1943 to be at least 0.9 billion larger.43 All of the prepayments are assumed to be made to nonfinancial corporations.
All of this indicates that nonfinancial corporations in 1943 will have an increase of 6.9 billion dollars in the resources available for acquiring government securities, adding to their increase in cash holdings or bank deposits, or reducing their debts. Consequently, we may conclude that the increase in liquid assets and the reduction in indebtedness by nonfinancial corporations, i.e., by all corporations except commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and insurance companies, may be roughly 20.2 billions in 1943. VIII. The Volume of Individual Incomes in 7944, 7945, 1946 Any projections of the volume of individual incomes into 1944, not to mention 1945 or 1946, must be regarded as conjectural in the extreme. Obviously they depend in large 4a Survey of Current Business, April, 1943, p. 18, measure upon the outcome of price control. Nevertheless, it is desirable to make projections not only of incomes but also of personal taxes and consumer expenditures, for the purpose of indicating the economic results which would accompany the realization of different assumptions.
Three analyses are submitted which may be designated as follows:
1. "Perfect" control of prices and wages: The basic idea underlying this assumption is that there are no increases in prices after 1943 and no increases in the hourly earnings of employees except for changes in efficiency and for upgrading and service promotions. The difficult probtem of the effect of changes in efficiency on earnings will be discussed below. An increase of 1% a year in payrolls is assumed to be adequate to cover upgrading and service promotions. It will be noted that payrolls may still rise or fall because of changes in the number of employees, changes in the hours of work, changes in the time paid for at penalty rates, and shifts of employees from low-wage plants and industries to high-wage plants and industries.
2. "Good" control of prices and wages: Prices are assumed to rise after 1943 at 5 % a year. This rise affects the incomes of farmers and nonagricultural self-employed. Wage rates are also assumed to rise by 5 % a year less the gain in hourly earnings attributable to improvements in efficiency which originate with management. It is to be noted that the adjustment of wage rates to changes in the cost of living is assumed to extend to all employees including "whitecollar" workers. Canada has succeeded in maintaining considerably better than "good" price control according to this definition.
3. "Fair" control of prices and wages: Prices are assumed to rise after 1943 at 8 % a year. This rise affects the incomes of farmers and nonagricultural self-employed. Wage rates are assumed to rise by 8 % a year less the gain in hourly earnings attributable to improvements in efficiency which originate with management. The rise of 8% in prices, or "fair" price control, corresponds to the actual record in the United States during the last year and a half.
Several items, such as compensation to the armed services, other labor income (from such sources as workmen's compensation and various pension and relief payments), interest, net rents, and dividends, are not affected by variations in the three assumptions concerning the control of wages and prices; these items, therefore, are the same in all three cases. It is assumed that "other labor income" undergoes a slight increase after 1943 to allow for larger payments for workmen's compensation and for pensions. Interest and net rents have been rising by about 500 million dollars a year; it is assumed that this rise continues. Finally, it is assumed that there will be no important changes in total dividend disbursements.
A word should be said concerning the effect of changes in efficiency upon civilian wages and salaries. The amount of the gains in efficiency is set forth in Section V. It is assumed that two-thirds of the improvement in efficiency is attributable to management and one-third to the workers. During a strong sellers' market no significant part of the improvement in efficiency is likely to reduce prices in the open market. This means that the savings of greater efficiency are divided solely among employers, workers, and the government.
About one-third of the employees outside of agriculture are piece or bonus workers, and about two-thirds are time workers. Improvements in efficiency, whether originating with management or with the workers, will not immediately affect the compensation of time workers.44 On the other hand, some of the improvements in efficiency attributable to management (new and better machines, better organization of work, better control of raw materials, and the like) will enable piece workers to increase their earnings; this is particularly true because the tight labor market prevents management from making downward adjustments in piece rates in accordance with improvement of conditions or methods of work. It is therefore assumed that about one-sixth of the improvement in efficiency attributable to management goes to raise the earnings of workers. This portion is one-ninth of the total gain in efficiency. Furthermore it is assumed that all of the improvements in efficiency attributable to piece or bonus workers 44 The improvement in the efficiency of time workers may be compensated in part by "upgrading." 32 PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS VIII. INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 1944 , 1945 , 1946 go to raise their earnings; since about one-third of the employees are piece or bonus workers, about one-third of the increase in efficiency originating with the workers goes to raise payrolls. This portion is another one-ninth of the total gain in efficiency. Thus, two-ninths of the total increase in efficiency goes to raise payrolls. Under "good" and "fair" control of prices and wages, it is assumed that wage rates are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. Fairness requires that higher earnings going to workers as a result of efficiencies originating with management be allowed to reduce the obligations of employers to pay higher wage rates to offset advances in the cost of living. Hence, it is assumed, as stated above, that straight-time hourly earnings rise only by the amount of the increase in the cost of living minus the contribution to higher earnings made by efficiencies originating with management.
In EXHIBIT IV three tables designated Assumptions D, E, and F set forth the movement of income payments to indi- a It is assumed that the money compensation of men in the armed services averages $1,000. b Between 1943 and 1944 no change in working hours is assumed. It is assumed that civilian wages and salaries are affected by a drop in the number of nonagricultural employees from 39.9 million to 39.5 million. A 5% increase in the efficiency of war workers is assumed, but no change in the efficiency of nonwar workers. It is assumed that an increase of 1% covers upgrading and service promotions. A shift of 1.5 million workers from nonwar work into war work is assumed. Cf. EXH1BIT V. It is interesting to note that under the assumption of "perfect" control of prices and wages there is an appreciable drop in income payments to individuals between 1945 and 1946. This drop is produced by a decline of 5.8 billion dollars in the compensation of employees. Part of this figure (2.0 billions) is attributable to shrinkage in the number of men in the armed services. In the main, however, it is explained by a drop of 3.9 billions in civilian wages and salaries. This drop is attributable, not to a decline in wage rates, but to a drop in the number of hours worked and to a shift of workers from high-paying war industries to lower paying nonwar production. It is important to analyze the composition of payroll changes and to note the different influences which have t employees is assumed to increase from 39.5 milfion to 39.8 million. An increase of 3% in efficiency is assumed for both war industries and nonwar industries. It is assumed that an increase ol 1% covers upgrading and service promotions. A shift of 4.6 mdlion workers from war work to nonwar work is assumed. Cf. ExnmxT V. a Between 1945 and 1946 nonagricultural employees are assumed to increase from 39.8 mdlion to 40.6 million. A drop of 7% in the working hours of nonwar workers is assumed; because of the consequent reduction of penalty overtime payments and the payment of shift differentials, the payrolls ofnonwar workers are assumed to drop 10.5 %, resulting in a 6.8 % decline in total payrolls. Efficiency is assumed to rise 3 % in war industries and 5 % in nonwar industries. I t is assumed that an increase of 1% covers upgrading and service promotions. Cf. EXmBZT V.
• Between 1942 and 1943 other labor income (workmen's compensation, pensions, unemployment compensation and relief) is assumed to increase at the same rate as during the first half of 1943. Small increases in these payments are assumed for 1944, 1945, 1946 because of larger payments for pensions and for workmen's compensation. /Net income of farm operators is assumed to increase 25 % between the third quarter of 1942 and the third quarter ot 1943 and 20 % between the tourth quarter of 1942 and the fourth quarter of 1943. After 1943 efficiency in agriculture is assumed to rise by 2% a year. 0 Between 1942 and 1943 the hours of work of nonagricultural proprietors are assumed to rise by 2.5% (the approximate amount indicated for employees in nonmanufacturing pursuits) and the prices received by these men to rise by 8% (the approximate rise in the cost of living for the year). The number of nonagricuhural proprietors is assumed to drop from 2.5 million in 1942 to 1.9 million in 1943 and 1.7 milhon in 1944, and then to rise to 1.9 million in 1945 and 2.1 million in 1946. The efficiency of nonagricultural proprietors is assumed to remain unchanged between 1942 and 1943, to remain unchanged between 1943 and 1944; to rise 3.0 % between 1944 and 1945, and to rise 5.0 % between 1945 and 1946 . These changes in efficiency correspond to the assumptions made for employees in nonwar industries. h Interest and net rents are assumed to rise by 500 million dollars each year as the)' have been doing in recent years. i It is assumed that total dividend disbursements will remain substantially unchanged for the entire war period. i It is assumed that one-fourth of the armed services were abroad in 1942 and that they spent onethird of their money income on foreign goods. ." It is assumed that one-third of the armed services will be abroad m 1943 and 1946 and that they will spend about one-third of their money income on foreign goods. tit is assumed that one-half of the armed services will be abroad in 1944 and 1945 and that they will spend one-third of their money income on foreign goods. operated in different years. EXHIBIT V presents the "anatomy" of payroll changes under the three assumptions of "perfect," "good," and "fair" control of wages. o Of the total increase of 13.9 billion dollars in payrolls between 1942 and 1943, about 6.3 billions is explained by higher wage rates, increases in efficiency, and upgrading. Increases in wage rates, however, are inconsistent with "perfect" control of wages. b Because of the rounding ol the figures, the totals in the above table do not always correspond precisely with the year to year changes in civilian wages and salaries in assumptions D, E, and F.
Particularly striking and important is the changing ,effect of different influences at different periods of time--indeed,
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PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS the opposite effect of the same influence in different periods. Thus, during the expansion of war production, changes in the number of hours worked and shifts of workers into higher paying plants and industries accounted for roughly half of the increase in payrolls. Now that war production is nearing its peak, increases in working hours and shifts into higher paying plants and industries are ceasing to increase payrolls. When the war against Germany ends, shifts out of war production will begin to reduce payrolls. There will probably not be large reductions in hours so long as the conflict with Japan continues. When that conflict is over, the reduction in hours may be expected to produce a substantial reduction in payrolls, to the extent that there are no compensating wage increases. In other words, during the war period an abnormally large number of workers have been working abnormally long hours in the plants and industries which pay the highest wages. Another shift out of these industries after the war and the reduction of hours to normal will, to some extent, exert a deflationary influence. Fortunately, this deflationary influence will be counteracted in large measure by the shift of about 8 million men of the armed services into civilian jobs which, on the whole, will probably pay slightly more than the army. i 'f old-age pension rates, then, would impose an additional tax of 4% on about half of the payrolls. Only half of this tax, in the short run, would fall on the workers. I hope that my assumption concerning the reluctance of civilians to participate in the war by paying higher personal taxes turns out to be grievously in error.
EXHIBIT VI, which is designated Assumption G, presents estimates of disposable income under "perfect," "good," and "fair" control of prices and wages after 1943.
X. The Volume of Personal Tax Pq)ÿments in 1944, 1945, and 1946 Estimates of the volume of personal tax payments involve guessing about the action of Congress, which in turn depends mainly upon public opinion. The American people are not used to high personal taxes (real estate taxes are another matter), and they are adverse to facing squarely the problem of paying for the war. I assume that there will be no further rise in personal taxes before the election of 1944. Furthermore, a rise after the election is improbable. The most that can be expected is the institution of the long-delayed regular contribution rates under the old-age pension scheme; it is assumed that this occurs in 1945 to take effect in 1946. The 1944, 1945, 1946 39 Although no increases in personal tax rates are assumed, yields will rise. Beginning with 1944, the 20% withholding tax will be effective for the entire year. Furthermore, yields will rise with rising incomes. In 1943 about 11% of the incomes of individuals will be absorbed by personal taxes. The proportion of increases in incomes which will be absorbed by direct taxes is higher, a natural result of the progressive rates. At the present time various exemptions exclude considerably more than half of individual income payments from taxation. It is assumed that 60% of the first 10 billion dollars increase in income above 135.0 billions will go into the tax base, 62%
of the second 10 billions, and 64 % of the third 10 billions. As the tax base expands, the average tax rate does not necessarily riseÿ Tax yields are assumed to be 25 % of the tax base.
XI. 46 Under "good" control of prices or "fair" control of prices the figure 1.8 billion dollars becomes 1.9 billions. Note that under the assumptions that have been employed, especially the assumption that all wages and salary payments are adjusted to changes in the price level, the volume of savings is little affected by whether the control of prices and wages is "perfect," "good," or "fair."
XIII. The Accumulation of Liquid Assets by Nonfinancial
Corporations in 1944, 1945, and 194(5 The most satisfactory way to estimate the accumulations of liquid assets by nonfinancial corporations for the years immediately following 1943 is to assume that they will be greater I f ! ENTERPRISES or less than the accumulations in 1942 by the amount that (1) business profits, (2) inventories, (3) expenditures for plant and equipment, and (4) prepayments on government contracts or sales of assets to the government are greatcr or less than in 1943. Implicit in this assumption, of course, is the additional assumption that there are no changes in dividend payments, in allowances for depreciation and depletion, or in other special reserves. This additional assumption, while not strictly true, is probably roughly accurate for the period of the war.
Corporate profits are assumed to remain the same as in 1943 (about 1.0 billion dollars above 1942) except that twoninths of the gains from increased efficiency are assumed to raise profits.47 As the savings from efficiency vary with the course of prices, the rise in profits from improvements in efficiency depends upon whether the control of prices is "perfect," "good," or "fair.''48 The rapid drop in inventories during 1943 (which may reach 3.6 billion dollars for the year) will probably continue during 1944, but at a diminished rate because the minima required for operating efficiency will be reached in some industries by the end of 1943 or soon after. A further drop in inventories of 2.4 billions (two-thirds of the drop during 1943) is therefore assumed for 1944; about 1.8 billions (three-quarters of the total drop in inventories) may be assumed to occur among incorporated enterprises. About 450 million dollars of the 13.3 billions accumulation of liquid assets in 1942 was made possible by the reduction in inven-4ÿ The changes in efficiency are discussed in Section V (3). As explained in Section VIII, two-ninths of the savings from improved efficiency are assumed to raise wages. Under the extreme seller's market none of the savings are assumed to be given to consumers in the form of lower prices. Of the seven-ninths of the savings accruing to corporations before taxes five-ninths are assumed to go to the government in the form of higher taxes, leaving two-ninths to raise profits. tories (three-fourths of the total reduction in inventories in 1942); consequently, apart from the effect of any other changes in inventories, the accumulation of liquid assets (other things being equal) will annually be 450 millions less than in 1942. In Section VI it was pointed out that the expenditures on plant and equipment outside the war industries must be expected to be much less in 1943 than in 1942; a drop from 6.7 billion dollars in 1942 to 3.0 billions in 1943 was assumed. Some increase in 1944 will probably be necessary, despite the very acute shortages of consumers' goods, in order to maintain reasonable efficiency. With the defeat of Germany a considerably larger expenditure on plant and equipment will be possible; furthermore, the expansion of the output of nonwar goods will produce some rise in inventories, especially of goods in process. In terms of 1943 dollars it is assumed that expenditures of all enterprises on plant and equipment and possibly to some extent on the increase of inventories after Prepayments on government contracts and sales of existing assets to the Federal Government in 1942 were about 1.8 billion dollars.S° The larger volume of war production in 1943 and 1944 warrants the assumption that prepayments in those years will be about 0.9 billion above 1942. In 1945 prepayments are assumed to be the same as in 1942. In 1946 they are assumed to be 0.6 billion less.
These assumptions yield the estimates of the acquisition of liquid assets by corporations which are presented in EXHIBIT IX under the designation Assumption J. For convenience the estimates for 1942 are included. securities, other than war savings bonds purchased by individuals, have probably been bought to be held more or less indefinitely. Likewise, the savings represented by the purchase of government insurance will not be converted into goods on a large scale unless there is a serious postwar deflation. This saving, in other words, is a cushion against deflation, but not an inflationary threat. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that the disposition of individuals and business concerns to convert liquid assets into goods will depend upon the outlook for employment. If the outlook is bright, people will be far more disposed to convert savings into goods than if the outlook is dark or uncertain.51
It is reasonable to suppose that individuals and unincorporated businesses intend to spend virtually all of their in5x Of course, if unemployment becomes severe, many people will be forced to convert their savings into goods. The huge quantities of accumulated purchasing power make it difficult to visualize a long or pronounced slump after the war, although there may be a considerable volume of "conversion" unemployment for a year or two. "Conversion" unemployment may be regarded as primarily engineering rather than economic in character because it will be caused, not by a lack of demand for goods, but by the fact that plants and machines will not be ready to produce goods.
XlV. "HOTÿ' AND ÿ'WARMÿ SAVINGS 45 44 PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS creased holdings of cash or demand deposits fairlysoon after the war, say within a year or two; that is probably why they hold part of their savings in these forms. Time deposits will be spent sooner or later, but by no means as soon as demand deposits. Many of the war savings bonds also will be converted into goods soon after the war; this is particularly true of war savings bonds purchased under payroll deduction plans. The conversion of war savings bonds, however, will undoubtedly proceed much more slowly than the conversion of cash and demand deposits. Many people will be reluctant to cash their war savings bonds for less than the face value. Furthermore, many people undoubtedly regard their war savings bonds as a more or less permanent addition to their savings. These people would probably be willing to cash their bonds to buy a lot or to build a house, but not to finance current consumption.
That part of wartime savings which is particularly sensitive to influences which create a disposition to spend may be designated as "hot" savings; that part which is moderately sensitive to influences to spend, which will be converted into goods only after the "hot" savings are gone, may be called "warm" savings. The savings which are intended to be held more or less permanently may be called "cold" savings. It should be emphasized that there is no sharp dividing line between "hot" and "warm" savings. The "hot" savings are simply those which will be spent first and in response to the least stimulus. Cash and demand deposits are classified as "hot" savings, and half of the war savings bonds as "warm" savings.52 Time deposits, which are probably neither very "hot" nor very "warm," are classified as "warm" savings.
The classification of reduction of short-term indebtedness raises some doubts. Much may be said for regarding it as "hot" on the ground that people who have got out of debt 52 The remainder of the war savings bonds are assumed to be "cold" savings.
This does not mean that they will be held as savings indefinitely, but it does mean that a high level of salesmanship will be necessary to persuade the holders to convert them into goods. The "cold" savings accumulated during the war are a challenge particularly to the building-construction industry. I ! will be ready to go into debt again rather promptly. On the other hand, many people will prefer to spend their cash and bank deposits before they incur short-term indebtedness. Consequently, it seems desirable to classify reduction of shortterm indebtedness as "warm" savings.53
What proportion of future incomes of individuals and unincorporated businesses will take the form of "hot" and what proportion the form ot "warm" savings? In 1942 out of total savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses of 26.5 billion dollars, "hot" savings were 6.7 billions. These consisted of about 4.2 billions in cash and about 2.5 billions in demand deposits.5ÿ Increases in time deposits were 0.6 billion, purchases of war savings bonds were 8.0 billions (half of which are assumed to be "warm"), and reduction of short-term indebtedness was 2.8 billions; hence "warm" savings in 1942 were 7.4 billions. It is assumed that in subsequent years the proportion will be roughly the same as in 1942. Correction should be made, however, for the fact that in 1942 residential building absorbed about 1.5 billions of individual savings, whereas in subsequent war years the opportunity to spend on residential housing will be less than in 1942. Consequently, it is advisable to assume that in subsequent years "hot" and "warm" savings will be in the same proportion to total savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses less expenditures 53 Mr. S. Morris Livingston, Chief of the National Economic Unit of the Department of Commerce, has called attention to the important indirect effects of the holding of large quantities of cash and war savings bonds upon consumption.
Many people, because of uncertainties concerning the future, might hesitate to convert their cash, bank deposits, or war savings bonds into goods. On the other hand, the very fact that people possess substantial supplies of cash, deposits, and war savings bonds will lead them to spend an unusually large fraction of their current income.
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PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS XV. '¢HOTÿ AND ÿWARMÿ PERSONAL SAVINGS 47 on residential housing as they were in 1942.55 The reduction of short-term consumer indebtedness, which was very large in 1942, will not go on indefinitely. It is assumed that, as consumers clean up their debts, they will increase their purchases of war savings bonds; this assumption undoubtedly underestimates the increase in "hot" savings of individuals.
XV. "Hot" and "Warm" Personal Savings What proportions of the "hot" and "warm" savings of individuals and unincorporated businesses are personal and what proportions ale business savings? This question is important because the motivation governing the expenditure of personal savings is ve.ry different from that governing the spending of business savings. Of the increase of 4.3 billion dollars in cash outside banks, the best opinion is that 4.1 billions went to individuals. Considerable uncertainty attaches to the distribution of the increase in demand deposits. Investigations within the Federal Reserve System have led to the opinion that the increase in personal deposits in fifteen months between December 31, 1941, and March 31, 1943 , was between 2 billion dollars and 4 billions. An amount close to the lower figure is to be preferred. This indicates a rise of 1.5 billions in demand deposits in personal accounts during 1942. Practically all of the increase of 0.6 billions in time deposits and virtually all of the noncorporate purchases of war savings bonds and the reduction in consumer indebtedness in 1942 may be regarded as personal savings. The total increase in "hot" and "warm" personal savings during 1942 was about 12.9 billions, of which approximately 5.5 billions (cash and demand deposits) were "hot" and 7.4 billions (time deposits, half of the war savings bonds, and the reduction of consumer indebtedness) were "warm."
Is one justified in assuming that in the several years immediately following 1942 "hot" and "warm" personal savings will bear the same ratio to the total savings of individuals and unincorporated business enterprises (less private expenditures for residential housing) as they did in 19427 Obviously this assumption would be applicable only in a sellers' market similar to 1942. Furthermore, it is likely to be rendered untrue by changes in the number of unincorporated concerns or by changes in cost-price relationships which affect the income of small concerns. Nevertheless, for the time being, the ratios of 1942 provide the most satisfactory basis for estimating "hot" PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS XVI. ¢¢HOT" AND €'WARM" SAVINGS OF CORPORATIONS 49
and "warm" personal savings. EXHIBIT XI, which is designated Assumption L, presents estimates of "hot" and "warm" personal savings for the war period.
EXHIBIT XI. ASSUMPTION L--"HoT" AND "WARM" PERSONAL SAVINGS (In billions of dollars) XVI. "Hot" and "Warm" Savings of Nonfinancial Corporations ,t ! Nonfinancial corporations may be expected sooner or later to convert into goods all of their accumulations of government bonds. A large part of the recent additions to their cash and bank deposits are a necessary increase to working capital at the present high levels of business. Part of these accumulations, however, are not necessary; this is indicated by the fact that velocity of circulation is about 20% below the 1935-1939 average. The proportion of liquid assets held by corporations which should be regarded as "hot" is best measured by the volume of expenditures which will be required to meet accumulated physical needs, to keep up with improvements made by competitors, and to take advantage of unusually attractive investment opportunities. The remainder of the liquid assets of corporations may be regarded as "warm."
The "hot" liquid assets of corporations are best estimated in terms of (1) deferred replacements; (2) deferred maintenance; (3) inventory shrinkage; (4) the out-of-pocket cost of reconverting from war work to civilian production; (5) urgent new investments to take advantage of technological changes or to adjust business to shifts in population, new forms of competition, or other new conditions. Estimates on all of these items must be regarded as highly conjectural.
Deferred replacements are measured by using expenditures on plant and equipment in 1939 as a bench mark. These were 7.1 billion dollars. In 1939 the Department of Commerce, the National Industrial Conference Board, and staff members of the Securities and Exchange Commission estimated that there were virtually no net savings by business enterprises. The amount by which expenditures on plant and equipment fall below expenditures in 1939 is assumed to represent the deferred replacements. Not all of the deferred replacements occur in plants operated by corporations, but by far the great majority of them do. This is a result of the fact that the part of industry requiring the most capital is operated by corporations. It is assumed that three-fourths of the deferred replacements occur in corporate operated plants.
Deferred maintenance is assumed to run about 10 % below "normal" expenditures in 1942 , and 25% below "normal" in 1943 and 1944 . In 1945 maintenance is assumed to rise to "normal." "Normal" expenditures for maintenance of plant and equipment are estimated at about 2.9 billion dollars a year. s 6
Expenditures on the maintenance of private plant in the railroad, telegraph, telephone, pipe line, gas, electric light and power, and street railway industries in 1942 were about 1. The severe excess profits tax naturally stimulates enterprises to maintain plants and equipment in as good condition as priorities and labor shortages permit. Consequently, it will not be surprising if actual outlay for maintenance in 1943 and 1944 is very high. This condition will not mean, however, that a large amount of deferred maintenance is not accumulated. Some expenditures will be made because of the tax law which under ordinary circumstances would not be made, and many other expenditures which should be made in the interests of operating economy will be prevented by lack of men and material. Hence there may be a large amount of deferred maintenance even if expenditures on maintenance in 1943 reach an all-time high.
5ÿ "Reconversion" is not easy to define, and some of the difference in estimates undoubtedly springs from failure to define it in a uniform manner. Some war plants are going to return to producing more or less the same things which they always produced. Other organizations, which have assembled men with managerial and technological skills, will shift to the making of totally new products. For example, some shipyards which are "war babies" may attempt to shift into prefabricated houses. Between these extremes there will be all degrees of mixtures. The cost of reconversion is meant to apply only to the cases which lie in the Each year, because of technological changes or market shifts, there is a certain amount of investment on the part of business which promises unusually attractive profits. This is the part of investment which is urgent, which occurs even in the face of a general situation which is unfavorable. It is assumed to run about 1.0 billion dollars a year. Since such investment will not be possible during the war years, it is assumed to accumulate. The war itself will create so many attractive investment opportunities that the estimate of the accumulation of a billion a year is probably low rather than high. biles. All in all, reconversion is important in industries which, after the war, may be expected to employ no more than a million workers. The cost of reconversion is mainly an equipment expense. Investment in manufacturing machinery, tools, and implements was estimated by the National Industrial Conference Board at about 11.8 billion dollars in 1937, or approximately $1,400 per wage earner (exclusive of salary workers) in manufacturing. (Economic Almanac, 1942 -1943 .) The engineering part of reconversion cost (that is, the cost of repairing and arranging machinery and the cost of such new machines as may be necessary to replace machines worn out in war work) is not likely to be more than one-quarter of the total investment in equipment per wage earner in those industries which have a real reconversion problem. The total number of wage earners at the prewar level of employment in such industries was not more than about 800,000. Hence, the cost of arranging plants and equipment so that this number of employees could perform their former jobs would not be more than about 280 miilion dollars. (The expense of enlarging plants to meet postwar demands should, of course, be counted an investment, not a reconversion cost.) Some allowance should be made for out-of-pocket overhead expenses during the period of conversion when the plant is able to sell goods neither to the government nor to private consumers. It is assumed that only one-tenth of manufacturing is affected, but that outlays for salaries are 50% above 1940. Interest payments and taxes, other than Federal income taxes and excise taxes, are assumed to be the same as in prewar. The reconversion is assumed to last three months. This makes the out-of-pocket overhead about 130 million dollars. The total cost to the community through loss of product will be much greater. 58 The assumption that half of the war savings bonds are purchased to be held until maturity and should be classified as "cold" savings is more realistic, I believe, than the assumption that all of the purchases of war savings bonds should be classified as "warm" savings.
Comparisons of the estimates presented in this section and the two preceding ones indicate that the accumulations of "hot" and "warm" liquid assets by nonfinancial business enterprises, incorporated or not, are somewhat greater than the personal accumulations of individuals. In 1942 nonfinancial business concerns increased their "hot" and "warm" liquid assets by 14.5 billion dollars, and individuals, by 12.9 billions. In 1943 it is estimated that business enterprises will increase their "hot" and "warm" liquid assets by 21.7 billions; individuals, by 16.0 billions. If all of the purchases of war savings bonds were classified as "warm" savings, individuals would increase their "hot" and "warm" liquid assets slightly faster than business enterprises.58
Cumulative totals 2.4 9.9 15.7 17.5 17.0
The returns for 1942 indicate that my estimates for "hot" liquid assets are too small, and for "warm" liquid assets too large. In that year there was moderate inflation, as indicated by a rise in the indexes of the cost of living of 10.7%.59 Nevertheless, my methods of analysis indicate, not inflation, but a mild deflationary pressure, as the following computation shows:
Acquisition of "hot" and "warm" liquid assets 27.4 billion dollars Absorption of liquid assets by larger income paymentseÿ 11.3 Inflationary surplus 16.1 "Warm" liquid assets 18.3
Inflationary "hot" liquid assets --2.2
The reason for the smallness of my estimates is that I have not counted all of the increased holdings of cash and demand deposits by nonfinancial corporations as "hot" liquid assets. ÿa Should not all increases in cash and demand deposits by nonfinancial enterprises be regarded as "hot" assets? Surely a corporation will not hold large quantities of cash or demand deposits unless it expects soon to convert them into goods. In 1942 cash outside banks and demand deposits increased 14.0 billion dollars. Since 11.3 billions was absorbed by higher income payments, an inflationary surplus of 2.7 billions is 59 The rise in the price level of manufactured goods was also 10.7%. so In measuring the absorption of liquid assets by larger income payments, I have assumed that velocity of circulation in 1939 may be accepted as normal and that any increase in income payments for 1939 requires a proportionate increase in cash outside of banks and demand deposits. The problem of measuring the absorption of liquid assets by higher prices and production is discussed briefly in Section X/X. 6z It will be recalled that in Section XVI I measured the proportion of liquid assets of corporations which should be regarded as "hot" by the volume of inventory depletion, postponed replacement, deferred maintenance, cost of reconversion, and the accumulation of unusually attractive investment opportunities. Nonfmancial corporations seem to have increased their holdings of demand deposits and cash during 1942 by roughly 7.3 billion dollars. In Section XVI, however, I estimated the increase in "hot" liquid assets by nonfinancial corporations during 1942 at 2.4 billions.
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Despite the fact that I have plainly underestimated "hot" liquid assets by about 5.0 billion dollars, it is conservative, I believe, to adhere to my original figures and to base estimates of the increase in the "hot" liquid assets of nonfinancial corporations in 1943 and the years immediately following upon the methods employed in Section XVI. The reason for this judgment is that nonfinancial corporations are not likely in subsequent years to increase their cash and demand deposits as rapidly as they did in 1942. Consequently, the assumption that nonfinancial corporations put the same proportion of liquid assets into cash and demand deposits as they did in 1942 is likely to lead to an overestimate of "hot" liquid assets. Nevertheless, the reader should be warned that my estimates of "hot" liquid assets in the hands of nonfinancial corporations are intentionally low and that my estimates of "warm" liquid assets in the hands of nonfinancial corporations are therefore correspondingly high.
XVIII. "Hot" and "Warm" Liquid Assets Compared to Individual Income Payments and to Expenditures on Consumption
The best way to judge the economic significance of the accumulation of liquid assets is to measure them in relation to income payments and to consumption. This measurement is important because a rise in prices, which is associated both with a rise in income payments and a rise in expenditures on consumption, diminishes the purchasing power of "hot" 62 The efficiency of currency and demand deposits in financing income payments seems to have increased in 1942. Although there was a rise of 10 % in the monthly average in the index of the cost of living, adjusted demand deposits and currency outside of banks on December 31, 1942, stood at only 5.6 % above December 31, 1941. The figure for December 31, 1942, however, is misleading because nongovernmental demand deposits were temporarily reduced by the Victory Loan campaign of December, 1942. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the index of the velocity of circulation in banks outside of New York City dropped from 89.8% of the 1935-1939 average in 1941 to 85.8% in 1942. and "warm" savings. EXHIBITS XIII and XIV (pp. 56-58) present estimates (1) of the volume of "hot" and "warm" savings at various dates in relation to the level of income payments (Assumption N) and (2) of the volume of "hot" and "warm" personal savings in relation to expenditures on consumption (Assumption O). All "hot" and "warm" savings accumulated prior to 1942 and "hot" and "warm" savings accumulated by state and local governments during all years are omitted; to that extent the figures are too low.
These exhibits indicate that by the end of 1944 "hot" liquid assets will be equal to nearly three months' income payments and to about six months' expenditures on consumers' goods at the current rates. "Hot" personal savings alone by the end of 1944 will be equal to more than three months' expenditures on consumption. "Hot" and "warm" personal savings together by the end of 1944 will be equal to about seven months' expenditures on consumption. Unspent savings cannot prevent conversion unemployment, but they make it unlikely that there will be a prolonged and severe slump based on lack of demand.
The "warm" savings are considerably larger than the "hot," despite the fact that only half of the purchases of war savings bonds are counted as "warm." By the end of 1944 "warm" savings will be over 50% larger than "hot" savings.
.The size of the "warm" savings is important because they constitute one of the great uncertainties in the economic situation. Given a high degree of optimism on the part of the public, a large number of new or improved and attractive products, exceptionally well conceived marketing plans, or a combination of the foregoing conditions, a large part of "warm" savings will become "hot." Probably it would be just as well for American business not to convert the "warm" savings into "hot" too quickly after the end of the war. Moreover, part of the war savings bonds which I have classified as "cold" savings could be converted into demand for goods by new products which are sufficiently attractive and marketing campaigns which are sufficiently well planned. It is to be noted that the relationship of "hot" and "warm" savings, on the one hand, to income payments or, on the other hand, to expenditures on consumption is substantiMly affected by the control of prices and wages. As one would expect, the danger of a postwar slump is less and the danger of a postwar boom is greater under "perfect" control of prices and wages than under "good" or "fair" control. Consequently, one's judgment upon price policy during the war must depend upon one's view of problems after the war. If one fears a boom more than a slump, one should prefer a continuation of the present rise in the cost of living of about 8 % a year to more perfect control of the cost of living. Since the accumulations of "hot" and "warm" savings depend upon the length of the war, one's judgment of price policy must hinge partly upon one's judgment concerning the length of the war.
XIX. Are the Accumulated Liquid Assets an Ingationary Threat?
Fears are widespread that the great accumulations of liquid assets will sooner or later produce a disorderly rise in prices. Some persons attempt to measure the threat of inflation solely in terms of the rise in demand deposits and in currency outside banks. Such a measurement is erroneous. Efforts to convert war savings bonds or other government securities into goods or to expand consumer indebtedness to more or less normal levels would also be inflationary. Hence the inflationary problem is measured by the entire 100 billion dollars of "hot" and "warm" liquid assets which will have accumulated by the end of 1944.
A considerable increase in cash and demand deposits above prewar levels will be needed to support the larger volume of production and the higher price level which are likely to prevail after the war. In attempting to measure the extent to which accumulated liquid assets are inflationary, one must take account of this fact. The quantity needed will depend The cash and demand deposits required for any level of economic activity should correspond fairly closely to the volume ÿof income payments to individuals. Consequently, the change in income payments since 1939 furnishes a satisfactory basis for ascertaining the postwar requirements. The excess of liquid assets over the quantities required at a given level of income payments and at the velocity of circulation in 1939 may be called the "inflationary surplus." EXHIBIT XV, upon the velocity of circulation. It is not easy to select a norm for this velocity. Perhaps the turnover of money and deposits during the 1920's should be regarded as an ultimate norm. It seems safer, however, to start with prewar velocity as a norm; in other words, to take 1939. Velocity in that year was much below the 1920's. Since velocity in New York City is greatly affected by financial and speculative transactions (or lack of them), it is desirable to use velocity outside New York. designated Assumption P, indicates the inflationary surplus at different levels of income under "perfect," "good," and "fair" control of prices and wages.
How inflationary is the inflationary surplus? Most of it consists of "warm" rather than "hot" liquid assets. That is important to bear in mind. Nevertheless, the inflationary surplus in the form of "hot" savings promises to be substantial by the end of 1944, about 16.2 billion dollars under "fair" control of prices. This figure is 12.7% of estimated disposable income of 127.9 billions. In other words, an attempt to convert this volume of surplus "hot" liquid hssets into goods would raise the nongovernmental demand for goods by about 12.7 %. The increase in the total demand for goods (governmental and nongovernmental) would be a little over 8.0%.63 (Under "perfect" control of prices the surplus "hot" liquid assets would be larger both in absolute amount and relative to income payments.)
If industry were operating substantially below capacity, an increase of 8.0% in the demand for goods would have little effect upon prices. But under the conditions assumed for 1944, industry would be operating above capacity.64 Under these conditions the attempt to convert 16.2 billion dollars of "hot" liquid assets into goods would mainly affect prices, raising them by roughly 8 % more than the 8 % by which they would otherwise advance. This would make the price rise for the year over 16 %. This rise in prices would cause some of the "warm" liquid assets to be converted into goods. Plainly it is of crucial importance whether a large or only a small fraction of "warm" liquid assets would be affected. By the end of 1944, under "fair" control of prices, the inflationary surplus in the form of "warm" liquid assets would be very large, i.e., 64.0 billion dollars, or nearly half of the disposable income indicated in Assumption G. Consequently, if the expectation of higher prices were to cause a large fraction of "warm" liquid assets to become hot, the rise in prices would be swift and disorderly.
Judgments are bound to differ on the effect of a fairly rapid advance in prices (about 16% a year) upon "warm" liquid assets. In fact, until much more is known concerning the ownership of the "warm" assets, a satisfactory basis for judgment does not exist. My guess is that expectations of moderate price increases (up to about 20% a year) will not induce many owners of "warm" assets to convert them into goods.
Some special sales appeal, particularly the availability of new and attractive goods, will be necessary to persuade most owners of "warm" liquid assets to convert them into goods. This conversion is likely to extend over several years.
This analysis indicates that the inflationary threat from the accumulation of "hot" and "warm" liquid assets, though serious, is probably less dangerous than has been generally feared. Of course, the longer the war, the more menacing will be the inflationary threat. And the danger is probably great enough so that "good" or "fair" control of prices and wages during the war is preferable to "perfect" control.
One of the best ways to judge the inflationary threat from the increase in "hot" and "warm" assets is to compare the present and prospective accumulation with the accumulation during the First World War. It was pointed out in SECTION XVIII that the best measure of the economic significance of liquid assets is their size in relation to national income and consumer expenditures. Comparisons with the First World War should take account of the fact that income payments and consumer expenditures were much below present levels. The reader may supply the figures for "perfect" and "good" control of prices and wages by consulting Assumptions N and O in Section XVIIL "Fair" control of prices and wages was used in constructing EXHIBIT XVII (1) partly because it yields smaller cumulative totals than the other two and (2) partly because it is likely to be closer to the actual movement of prices than the assumptions of "perfect" or "good" control of prices. "Hot" and "warm" savings are defined far more broadly for the First World War than for the present war. In the case of the First World War all purchases of government securities by individuals and nonfinancial corporations are counted as "warm" savings. For the present war there are excluded from "warm" savings half of the war savings bonds purchased by individuals and all of the other government securities purchased by them.69 Nevertheless, by the end of 1943, the accumulation of "hot" and "warm" savings will be virtually as large, relative to incomes, as were the accumulations of all cash, bank deposits, and government securities outside banks and insurance companies between 1914 and 1919. By the end of 1944 the volume of "hot" and "warm" savings will be far larger relative both to incomes and to consumption than in 1919. This does not necessarily mean that the threat of postwar inflation is much greater now than in 1919. There has been ample evidence in the last ten years to show that inflation depends upon men's state of mind quite as much as upon the quantity of purchasing power. The expansion of currency during the First World War readily produced a rapid rise of prices because men still possessed the optlmism of the nineteenth century. After the long and severe depression of the 1930's, purchasing power may expand enormously with very little effect on prices.
XX. The Accumulation of Liquid
XXI. "Hot" and "Warm" Savings in Relation to Some Problems of Shifting from War Production to Nonwar Production A considerable increase in liquid assets during the war may be needed to finance the transition to peacetime production. Is the accumulation of "hot" and "warm" savings ample to PRESENT SAVINGS AND POSTWAR MARKETS XXII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
71
(5) The accumulation of liquid assets will go on at an increasing rate so long as the war against Germany continues.
The termination of the war against Germany would make possible a considerable drop in the accumulation of liquid assets.
(6) The volume of liquid assets accumulated is little affected by whether the control of prices and wages is "perfect, .... good," or "fair." (It would be greatly affected, however, by "good" control of prices and only "fair" control of wages and salaries.) (7) -The purchasing power of liquid assets is greatly affected by whether the control of prices and wages is "perfect," "good," or "fair." The danger of a disorderly rise in prices after the war is less with "fair" control of prices now than with "perfect" control. (9) The end of the war will bring into effect powerful influences (shrinkage in the size of the work force, reduction in working hours, reduction in hours compensated at penalty rates, and shifts into lower-paying industries) which will produce substantial reductions in payrolls without any changes in wage rates. During this transition, stability may be promoted by a moderate rise in prices and wages--for the purpose of preventing a drop in dollar purchasing power.
(10) The enormous accumulations of liquid assets support the view that conversion unemployment will be fundamentally engineering rather than economic in origin and will be no greater than required by the time needed to prepare plants for new operations. At the time of conversion to civilian production the country will have on hand far larger reserves against unemployment and far larger supplies of unused purchasing power than it has ever possessed.
(11) Employers' fears concerning their ability to meet the costs of conversion or their fears that the disposal of government-owed inventories or the cancellation of war contracts will impose disastrous losses on business appear, on the whole, to be greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, there are bound to be many extreme cases in which there will be hardship. The policies of the government in cancelling contracts and in administering inventories should take account of these cases and tax laws should encourage the accumulation of reserves against losses.
(12) No one knows what proportion of the enormous accumulations of liquid assets will be "hot," "warm," or "cold" after the war. The proportions will depend upon the relations between the government and business (since nearly half of the accumulations will be held by business concerns), the optimism or pessimism with which individuals view their employment prospects, the success of business in developing new and attractive products, and the skill with which business presents its products to the public. It seems reasonably certain, however, that the "warm" liquid assets will be considerably larger than the "hot." This is one reason for believing that the danger of inflation after the war is less threatening than it is frequently represented to be.
(13) A substantial part of the increase in liquid assets in 1942 was absorbed by the expansion in production and the rise in prices. A smaller proportion will be absorbed in these ways in 1943 and a still smaller proportion in 1944. Thus the inflationary surplus in 1943 and in 1944, and in the following years (if the war continues) will be substantially larger than in 1942.
(14) Most of the inflationary surplus will consist of "warm" liquid assets rather than "hot" liquid assets. There will always be the danger that "warm" liquid assets will become "hot." Nevertheless, it is probable that most of the "warm" inflationary surplus will not become "hot" simply in response to the expectation of moderate increases in prices.
(15) By the end of 1943 the accumulation of "hot" and "warm" savings will be as large relative to income payments as it was by the middle of 1919 in the First World War. By the end of 1944, if the war continues, the accumulation will be far larger. The inflationary influence of liquid assets today, however, cannot be measured simply by comparing their size relative to income payments or to expenditures on consumption with the accumulation during the First World War. The change in the temper of the times alters the inflationary effect of a given proportion of liquid assets to income.
(16) The large liquidation of government securities by individuals and business enterprises in the early years after the war will confront the government with great questions of fiscal policy. Under these conditions the government will probably find it desirable to create and maintain a substantial budget surplus for some years after the war.
(17) The long depression and the poor recovery in the United States have badly distorted the ideas of businessmen (and of public officials and some economists) concerning what levels of production and employment are normal. Consequently, in the years immediately after the war most business enterprises are likely to plan too little production rather than too much.
(18) In order to limit the demand for goods in the first two years after the war, the loss carry-back provision of the corporate income tax should be extended to five years. This would encourage corporations to spread over a longer period the realization of losses on equipment which must be replaced.
(19) The enormous accumulations of liquid assets give American businessmen a far greater opportunity than they have ever had to determine the demand for goods and hence the level of employment by developing new and better products and by improving their price policies and their marketing methods. This unusual opportunity may not last indefinitely, but it will exist to an unusual extent for five to ten years after the war.
(20) There is no assurance that American businessmen will time their efforts to influence demand so as to promote business stability. Business concerns may be successful in converting "cold" savings into "hot" at precisely the times when demand for goods is overtaxing the productive capacity of industry. American businessmen, therefore, have the inescapable social responsibility of working out arrangements by which they can time their influence upon demand so as to promote stability of employment rather than to accentuate the fluctuations of business. The huge accumulations of liquid assets so greatly increase the potential instability of business that it would be hazardous in the extreme for businessmen to fail to create effective arrangements for stabilizing their own influence upon the demand for goods.
(21) Although the conversion of wartime savings into goods will make a high level of employment abnormally easy to maintain for a few years, a difficult transition will lie ahead--the shift from a "catching-up" economy to a self-sustaining economy.
